The Kremlin’s Kursk problem: the first consequences of the Ukrainian attack on Russia
The Ukrainian military action in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, which began on 6 August, came as a surprise to the Kremlin and a shock to the Russian public. The military and civilian leadership, as well as the state propaganda, tried to conceal its impact and downplay its scale. The authorities acted – especially at the beginning – chaotically and ineffectively, neglecting to organise an orderly evacuation of the population. The propaganda, at times failing to provide a consistent narrative, focused on Ukrainian losses allegedly suffered as a result of effective Russian counter-attacks. Some propagandists accused the West (and above all the US and the UK) of coordinating the Ukrainian action.
The residents of the border regions affected by the Ukrainian operations have made no secret of their dismay and irritation at the ineffectiveness of the authorities' response and the difficulties of daily life. During the operation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces seized the Sudzha gas metering station on the only operational line of the pipeline transporting Russian gas through Ukraine to the EU. There was no disruption of supply, but this triggered a slight increase in gas prices on European exchanges. The Russian authorities were disappointed by the passive or even benevolently neutral Western reaction to the Ukrainian action.
The Ukrainian incursion represents a serious political and reputational challenge for the Kremlin, the biggest since Yevgeny Prigozhin's revolt in June 2023. It exposes significant deficiencies in the effectiveness of the Russian central and regional authorities. Above all, however, it is a blow to the image built up by Vladimir Putin's regime of the war as effective, nearing victory, and conducted exclusively on Ukrainian territory. The actions of the Ukrainians bring the war – on an unprecedented scale – to Russian territory, increasing its socio-political cost.
At this stage, however, there is no reason to believe that the unfolding events will trigger a major change in Moscow's policy or that they will alter its aggressive strategic objectives in relation to Ukraine and the West. The failure of the Russian special services and Armed Forces which allowed the capture of the border districts of the Kursk region may lead to a few dismissals in the military and security apparatus and among local officials, but these are unlikely to happen quickly, as they could be perceived as an admission of systemic failure. Instead, the Ukrainian incursion will provide a pretext for further tightening of the information blockade in Russia and for intensification of repression targeting those suspected of disloyalty. It will worsen the public mood and intensify criticism from parts of society towards the authorities, but in the short term, it will not threaten the stability of the regime.
Ineffectiveness of the authorities
On 7 August, Putin, at a meeting with members of the government, described the Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region as a 'large-scale provocation'. On the same day, he convened a meeting of military and security chiefs to discuss the situation in the region. It was attended by Chief of General Staff General Valery Gerasimov, Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and FSB chief Aleksandr Bortnikov. Gerasimov claimed that the military stopped the forward movement of Ukrainian forces, emphasised their losses and promised their ejection from Russian territory. During the meeting Putin was visibly upset. On the same day, he spoke to the acting governor of the Kursk region, Alexei Smirnov, and instructed the government to show the necessary assistance to the residents.
On 7 August, regional authorities in Kursk imposed a regional state of emergency. On 9 August, in turn, a federal state of emergency was declared in the region, which meant that the federal authorities assumed responsibility for “liquidation of the consequences” of the attack. The federal emergency is declared when the number of victims exceeds 500 people, or the material damage exceeds the sum of 500 million roubles. The victims are then entitled to, among other things, a one-off payment of 15,000 roubles per person and to compensation for damaged or lost property (up to 150,000 roubles). So far, Putin has ordered a payment of 10,000 roubles to everyone forced to leave their place of residence.
On 9 August, a meeting of the permanent members of the Russian Security Council was held, with Bortnikov reporting on the situation. On the night of 9–10 August, the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) regime under the supervision of the FSB was imposed in the Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk regions. This resulted in the expansion of the powers of the security apparatus, including the right to introduce transport blockades, control means of transport, cut off communications, carry out forced evacuations of the population, and close down businesses, as well as imposing restrictions on the formal civic rights of the population. On 10 August, the Ministry for Emergency Situations reported that some 76,000 people had been evacuated (in fact, fled) from the Kursk region. On 12 August, an evacuation was ordered in the Krasnoyaruzhsky District of the Belgorod region. Regional authorities across the rest of Russia were instructed to voice their solidarity with the Kursk region and to be ready to render assistance, including by hosting refugees. Parliamentarians and officials were ordered to refrain from commenting and to clear every statement with the security apparatus.
The authorities also imposed further restrictions on the circulation of information on the internet and on social media. While it is true that the slowdown of YouTube – which is very popular in Russia – had already begun before the Ukrainian operation (1 August), Roskomnadzor imposed a complete blockade within the Russian Federation on 8 August. On 9 August, Signal messenger was also affected.
Downplay and manipulate: Kursk in Russian propaganda
The armed incursion by the Ukrainians in the Kursk region has become a major theme in Russian propaganda. It has forced the Kremlin media to dramatically change its narrative, which in recent months had an optimistic tone and argued that Russia was on the verge of winning the war. The Ukrainian action was described as a 'great provocation' and a 'terrorist attack' – apparently to avoid admitting that Russia is waging a war. Since the very fact of the incursion demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the authorities, it presents a difficult and extremely challenging topic for propaganda. The pressing need to comment on the attack has led to a shift away from coverage of other events, which were limited (such as the US elections) or almost completely marginalised (like the prisoner exchange between Russia and the West).
As early as 8 August, the state propaganda falsely claimed that the Ukrainian advance had been stopped and the situation was stabilising. In the following days, the coverage was fleeting and perfunctory to avoid undermining the earlier message. The propaganda narrative was intended to be reassuring and it claimed that the authorities led by Putin were in full control of the situation, the local population was receiving necessary assistance and Russian society closed ranks and is not prone to panic. Much coverage was devoted to allegedly numerous gestures of solidarity with the victims and volunteer assistance pouring in from all over Russia. The coverage emphasised civilian casualties while remaining completely silent about Russian military losses. This narrative was designed to cover up the lack of effective border defences, which allowed Ukrainians to penetrate Russian territory in an unprecedented manner and was thus compromising for the authorities. The Kremlin propaganda argued that the Ukrainian incursion was senseless from a military standpoint and motivated solely by propaganda purposes, and claimed that Ukraine was a terrorist state engaged in killing defenceless civilians.
Initially, the Russian propaganda offered several contradictory versions of the West’s – especially the US’s – attitude towards the Ukrainian incursion. One version, claimed that Kyiv had prepared the action behind Washington's back, and alleged – on a hopeful note – that an exasperated White House demanded an explanation from Ukraine. It predicted that the Ukrainian ‘excess’ might cause the Western allies to suspend military aid. Another version asserted that that the West (UK and US) not only knew about the Ukrainian action, but even coordinated it themselves. The supposed proof was that Western equipment – including the Polish Krab gun-howitzers – had been used in the attack and that allegedly numerous Western mercenaries were spotted in the territories invaded by Ukrainians.
Both the contradictory nature of the propaganda narrative and various technical details of the state media’s operations suggest that they were completely surprised by the events. Also noteworthy is their uncharacteristic restraint in formulating threats of retaliatory action against Ukraine and – in particular – the West. Instead, the focus has been on identifying those who can be blamed for failures on the Russian side and calling for their punishment, with fingers pointing at military bloggers and media commentators, who have been accused of sowing panic in society.
Shock and fear: public reactions to Kursk
There is no indication (and even no propagandistic claims) that the Russian inhabitants of the areas attacked by Ukraine have been offering spontaneous resistance to the Ukrainian forces or even attempting to organise themselves for this purpose. According to scattered information (mainly from social media and opposition outlets), the majority of residents decided to flee in chaos and panic, without waiting for an official evacuation. A minority took advantage of the assistance provided by the local authorities, which did not adequately prepare for the evacuation. On social media, residents complained that their loved ones remained in the affected areas because no one offered them help. There have also been reports of incidents of marauding and looting of abandoned homes by unspecified 'gypsy gangs'.
Inhabitants also complain about the failure of telephone and internet communications in the affected areas (presumably caused by the authorities to limit the flow of information that would be damaging for them). At the same time, the authorities pledged to provide free mobile phone access and mobile internet to residents in some areas, and to establish emergency inter-network roaming throughout the region.
A frequent attitude among the population is to publicly blame the local authorities for the lack of assistance and to appeal to Putin to provide security (including sending troops, repelling the attack, providing material aid). According to the awareness and experience of Russians, an appeal to the head of state (in the paradigm of good tsar – bad boyars) and are seen as the only effective method of soliciting help when systemic solutions fail. There is also no shortage of public expressions of disappointment that the authorities and state media are lying when they claim that everything is peaceful and back to normal in the invaded districts. However, for the time being, there is a lack of reflection on the real causes of the Ukrainian incursion, that could lead to a more critical attitude towards the war and the actions of the regime headed by Putin.
On the one hand, the attack on the border region reinforces anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western sentiments in society, which the Kremlin is using to mobilise citizens for war. The authorities may use it as a pretext for launching another formal mobilisation, which they have so far avoided. On the other hand, the incursion of Ukrainians into Russian territory clearly demonstrates the weakness of the state that is unable to secure its borders, its indifference to the fate of its own citizens, and the scale of hypocrisy in its propaganda. This may translate into growing societal anger and a gradual erosion of support for the regime, resulting in chaos and the degradation of social relations rather than leading to organised opposition to the Kremlin.
Anxiety: economic aspect
With their offensive, the Ukrainian Armed Forces took control of the Sudzha gas metering station, which is located 500 metres from the border. It is part of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod gas pipeline. As of May 2022, the Sudzha entry point is the only route through which Russian gas still reaches EU countries (mainly Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Austria) via Ukraine. In the first half of this year, around 8 bcm3 of gas was transported via this route, which is equivalent to 5% of total EU imports. So far, the Ukrainian gas pipeline network operator has reported a slight decrease in transmission along this section, indicating that the infrastructure remains intact. However, against the backdrop of transmission security concerns, the gas price on the TTF gas hub has risen by around 15% since 6 August.
Nevertheless, transmission could be suspended either due to collateral damage from military activity or as a deliberate decision by Gazprom. Gazprom might use the loss of control over the Sudzha station as a pretext for such a step, claiming force majeure. Blocking this route – although of minor importance to overall EU imports – would impact EU customers receiving Russian gas from this direction. The Russian claim that Ukraine's primary goal in seizing the Sudzha station was to pressure Slovakia and Hungary, both recipients of Russian gas and opponents of further military aid to Kyiv, is groundless. This is evident from two facts: gas transmission continues even after Ukraine took over the station, and Kyiv has indicated that it might extend its role as a transit country beyond the expiration of its contract with Gazprom at the end of this year.
Disappointment: Russia in the face of the West's benevolent neutrality towards Kyiv
On 7 August, White House National Security Communication Advisor John Kirby, during a press gaggle, stated that the Biden administration's policy on Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory has not changed and that they are acceptable as long as they strike targets that pose "imminent threats [located] just across the border" to Ukraine. He also acknowledged that the administration would be in contact with Kyiv to clarify the entire matter. Also on 7 August, a US State Department spokesperson denied that Ukraine had consulted with Washington prior to the Kursk region attack and confirmed that US policy on attacks on Russian territory had not changed and that the Ukrainian offensive was not a violation of that policy. Similar assessments were made at White House briefings on 8 and 10 August.
Responding to the US declarations on 7 August, Russian Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Antonov described the statements as "truly outrageous" and characterised the Ukrainian incursion as a "terrorist action", during which US weapons became "a tool for murdering ordinary Russians". He added that Russian borders are "sacred", and that the US should stop supplying Kyiv with weapons and "restrain neo-Nazis" from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Additionally, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, in a commentary on 7 August, described the Ukrainian actions as a "massive terrorist attack" of a "barbaric" nature and accused Ukrainian forces of committing "bloody crimes" against civilians. She further accused the West of a "cynical silence" towards alleged Ukrainian crimes, which supposedly "reinforces the sense of impunity of Ukrainian neo-Nazis", and called on the international community to "strongly condemn the criminal actions of the Kyiv regime".
The reaction of Russian diplomacy indicates that the Ukrainian military action was perceived as a serious blow to the image of the Russian Federation, necessitating an immediate response. It is noteworthy that not only did it not result in serious Russian retaliation against Ukraine or the West, but it also did not even trigger Russian threats, including those invoking nuclear escalation. The exceptions to this were statements by the deputy head of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, who called for expanding the territorial scope of Russian aggression (including Kyiv and Odesa) and, in response to the participation of German tanks in the Ukrainian operation, declared that "Russia will do everything to deliver new Russian tanks to [Berlin's] Republic Square".
This underscores the propagandistic nature of the alleged Russian 'red lines'. The strategy of the Russian Federation is to discredit Ukrainian actions by portraying them as being directed solely against civilians. Furthermore, Russian diplomacy is attempting to exploit the Biden administration's well-known fear of war escalation to push for a more restrictive interpretation of its proclaimed 'red lines' regarding the use of US weapons.
Political implications
The Ukrainian action in the Kursk region came as a shock to the Kremlin and represents the most serious political challenge since the Prigozhin rebellion. Neither previous raids by Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine, nor regular Ukrainian shelling of border territories and critical infrastructure inland, have compromised Moscow in a comparable way. Kyiv's actions exposed the weakness of the border defence system and the institutional mechanisms for preventing such threats, as well as the limited capacity to respond quickly to such incidents.
The regime's focus on persecuting internal enemies and the fear among its functionaries of reporting problems to Putin create potentially dangerous situations for the authorities' image in the eyes of the public. The events in the Kursk region (attack by Ukrainian troops, lack of an organised and effective evacuation, little financial support for residents) discredit the Kremlin’s claims of success and shatter the carefully constructed perception in society that the war is taking place far from the everyday lives of ordinary citizens.
However, isolated events of this kind do not threaten the stability of the regime, but their recurrence over a longer period may raise doubts on a larger scale about the correctness of the course taken by Putin – both within the ruling elite and society. The resignation of General Gerasimov, who oversees the military action against Ukraine, as well as that of individual representatives of the local security establishment and local authorities, cannot be ruled out (though most likely only after a long pause to avoid reputational damage). The operation will provide a pretext for further tightening of the information blockade and an increase in persecution against those suspected of disloyalty.
It is too early to assess the consequences of the Ukrainian operation for Russian tactics in its war against Ukraine. These outcomes depend, among other things, on the operation’s further developments and Moscow's ability to push the Ukrainians out of its territory. Russia is likely to continue the war as before, but an intensification of reprisals against Ukrainian civilians and the persecution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (according to the UN, 95% are already subjected to torture) seems very likely.
If the bridgeheads on Russian territory are maintained, the Ukrainian side will strengthen its position in possible future peace talks (potentially leading to an exchange for the border districts of the Kharkiv region occupied by the Russians). However, this is unlikely to diminish Moscow's territorial and political demands against Ukraine and the West.
