Criminal Russian attacks on Kryvyi Rih. Day 1140 of the war
Russian troops are advancing at a slow pace in most directions in the Donbas. They have again pushed Ukrainian soldiers out of most of the Toretsk quarters they had previously recaptured, and have seized new areas north of Toretsk. More villages between Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka have come under Russian control, and there was also a flanking of enemy forces holding out in the centre of Chasiv Yar. Russia made a significant ground advance on the western bank of the Zherebets River, but it does not affect the overall situation. They also pushed the defenders out of further positions west of Orikhiv in the Zaporizhzhia region and north of Kupiansk in the Kharkiv region.
After weeks of fighting, the Russians most likely captured Basivka in the Sumy region, but this is denied by the Ukrainian command. However, due to Russia reaching the Sumy-Kursk road near the Sudzha border crossing, the settlement has lost its previous importance for them. In Kursk Oblast, the Ukrainians are already holding out only in areas with a poorly developed road network – in the border town of Oleshnia (south of this border crossing) and west of Guyevo, which was recaptured by Russian troops.
President Volodymyr Zelensky has officially admitted that the Ukrainian army is conducting operations in the Belgorod region of the Russian Federation. Earlier, however, Russian forces pushed back the enemy from the border town of Demidovka, which they have been attacking for several weeks. Between 30-60 km2 of hostile territory in the Kursk and Belgorod oblasts remains under Ukrainian control, depending on sources. Dozens of square kilometres of Sumy Oblast are occupied by the Russians.
On 4 April, a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile exploded over residential buildings in Kryvyi Rih, killing 20 people, including nine children, and injuring more than 70. This is the highest single number of civilian casualties from a Russian attack since April 2024, when its missile struck Chernihiv. The Russians indirectly admitted that the target of the strike was a residential area – the missile was said to have hit a restaurant located there with Ukrainian brigade commanders and Western instructors allegedly present. Another attack on Kryvyi Rih took place on the same day in the evening – drones hit a business, killing one and injuring seven people. The premises were also the target of a ballistic missile that fell on the city on 2 April. Four people were killed and 17 injured.
On 6 April, Iskanders struck Kyiv, causing damage in three areas of the city. One person was killed and three injured. For the first time, the Ukrainian Air Force Command (UAFC) admitted its failure to repel an air attack on the capital and its environs – claiming to have shot down only one of the six ballistic missiles used by Russia. UAFC spokesman Yuriy Ihnat announced that only Patriot systems were effective against enemy ballistic missiles, and they do not have enough of them. The NASAMS and IRIS-T systems do not have the capability to counter this type of missile.
The attack on Kyiv was part of a massive strike in which, in addition to Iskanders, the invaders simultaneously employed drones and cruise missiles. These led to devastation in the Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Kyiv and Kirovohrad regions. In Sumy, eight hits were recorded solely as a result of the attack by drones. According to the UAFC, the Russians used a total of 23 missiles and 109 drones, of which the defenders shot down 13 and 40 respectively. 53 drones were claimed locationally lost.
A large number of civilian casualties were caused by Russian drone strikes on Kharkiv on 3 April – five people were killed and 34 injured. Drones also attacked the city twice on 2 April. As many as 14 strikes were recorded that evening. Zaporizhzhia (3 April), Dnipro (4 April) and Kyiv and Mykolaiv (5 April) were also targets of drones. From the evening of 1 April to the morning of 8 April, Russia used a total of at least 438 strike drones and their imitators, with the UAFC failing to provide data for 7 April, even though it itself had previously reported attacks using drones. 211 machines were shot down and 164 were locationally lost. The significant reduction in the number of drones used by Russia compared to previous weeks did not translate into an increase in the Ukrainian side’s claimed effectiveness against them. The enemy was also said to have used 28-30 missiles, 13 of which were shot down (all on 6 April).
On 2 April, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) presented data on the activity of the Russian intelligence services against Ukrainian citizens. According to the information, 22% of the recruited agents were minors used for sabotage actions and for planting explosive charges; 55% of those recruited were unemployed and 7% had a criminal past. The youngest unmasked by the SBU during the destruction of railway infrastructure was 13 years old.
The SBU has also published a list of people cooperating with the enemy, whose task is to promote Vladimir Putin’s idea of setting up a provisional commissariat in Ukraine under the aegis of the UN. The next stage of the ‘plan’ is to bring about elections in the country and the establishment of a ‘government’ agreeing to the Russian terms of the peace agreement. The SBU’s material shows that this ‘government’ will then attempt to set up ‘alternative diplomatic missions’ in EU countries. The leader of this group is Dmytro Vasilyev – chairman of the marginal pro-Russian Derzhava party which was outlawed in 2022. This initiative is a typical disinformation special operation to suggest the existence of a strong pro-Russian political movement in Ukraine.
On 4 April, Ukraine’s foreign intelligence service warned that the Russian intelligence services were intensifying an information operation against Ukraine. Messages undermining the legitimacy of the current government are being disseminated to justify the need for a ‘receivership’. The propagation of these solutions is also intended to provide an argument for why the Russian Federation is unable to conclude a peace agreement with Kyiv’s rulers. The operation is being conducted using the European media which supports the Russian narrative, and Telegram, Tik-Tok and YouTube. These are also being spread about an alleged split between Ukraine’s military and political leadership, the country’s inability to conduct warfare on its own or the disruption of Western support. The operation is aimed at injecting the Kremlin’s narrative on the prospects of an end to the conflict into the political discourse in Ukraine’s partner countries.
On 5 April, Ukrainian drones attacked industrial facilities in Chapayevsk in Samara Oblast and in Saransk in Mordovia. In Chapayevsk, the target was the Promsintez plant, which produces explosives (according to the SBU, there were successful hits), and in Saransk it was Optikovolokonnye Sistemy, which supplies fibre optics to, among other things, drones which Russia uses in Ukraine (an office building was damaged). According to Russian data, Ukrainian forces carried out two major attacks on Russian territory on 2 and 4 April – using at least 93 and at least 107 drones, respectively. On 4 April, one of the targets was said to be the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant. There is no information that the strikes resulted in significant damage. Moscow continues to accuse Kyiv of failing to comply with the moratorium on attacking energy infrastructure.
Norway will increase funding for military support to Ukraine by $4.6 billion (NOK 50 billion) in 2025. This was announced on 4 April by Finance Minister Jens Stoltenberg. The total contribution to Ukrainian defence there this year will be $7.8 billion (85 billion kroner). More than $455 million is to be spent on the purchase of munitions – $364 million under an initiative coordinated by the Czech Republic and $91 million through the European Peace Facility.
The value of the 25th Danish military aid package will be more than $981 million (DKK 6.7 billion), with funds to be provided between 2025 and 2027, the Danish Ministry of Defence announced on 3 April. Of this, $205 million will be spent on artillery and munitions, while the remaining funds will spent on air defence, national contributions to the drone and IT coalition, and investments in the Ukrainian arms industry.
Latvia has donated 1,500 drones to Ukraine, the country’s Defence Minister Andris Sprūds announced on 1 April. As part of the drone coalition, Latvian manufacturers will deliver 12,000 UAVs worth a total of €17 million to Kyiv in the first half of 2025.
Defence News, citing US and European sources, reported on 2 April that, for the first time, the US defence secretary will not attend the Ramstein-format meeting of the group of countries supporting Ukraine militarily. The meeting is due to take place on 11 April and is to be chaired by Germany and the UK. So far, no information has emerged on who will replace Pete Hegseth from the US side.
On 3 April, the Ukrainian Ministry of Digitalisation announced that Poland had donated a further 5,000 Starlink terminals to Ukraine. With the support of international partners, more than 50,000 devices have been made available to Kyiv. The largest number – 29,500– came from Poland, which spent PLN 323 million (around $83 mn) on the purchase and payment of subscriptions from the beginning of the invasion until mid-March this year.
Satellite imagery has confirmed that the construction of the Project 23900 Ivan Rogov multipurpose landing ship for the Russian Navy has been accelerated in Kerch, Crimea, in recent months. Its construction and that of its twin vessel, the Mitrofan Moskalenko began in 2020 as a result of the failure of the concept of acquiring French Mistral-type helicopter carriers for the Russian fleet (under pressure from the US, Paris withdrew from their sale). The ships were originally due to be completed this year, but Ukrainian attacks on Crimea between 2022 and 2024 led to a temporary halt in the work. According to the latest reports, the Ivan Rogov is expected to enter service in 2027. If this happens, it will be the largest ship in the Black Sea and the second largest in the Russian Navy (after the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov).
The resumption and acceleration of the construction of Ivan Rogov confirms that the Russians do not currently perceive enemy attacks on the peninsula as a serious threat. The Ukrainians, too, acknowledge that they are finding it increasingly difficult to achieve their objectives in Crimea. In an interview with Radio Svoboda on 7 April, the commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, referred, among other things, to the ‘multi-layered’ defence system of the peninsula created by Russia, which the Ukrainian kamikaze surface drones, successful in previous years, are currently unable to break through.
On 1 April, a member of the parliamentary committee on national security, defence and intelligence, Fedir Venislavskyi, revealed that the defence ministry had developed a new mechanism to allow for the selective rotation of soldiers at the front and the granting of several months’ rest after 90 days of service in a combat zone. This is an ad hoc step to improve service conditions where the defence ministry, under pressure from the General Staff, is delaying the adoption of a demobilisation law guaranteeing mandatory rotation, as it fears that extending it to 108,000 soldiers (including 14,000 officers) will worsen the situation at the front.
