No prospect for stability: internal and regional drivers of the situation in Syria

When Bashar al-Assad’s regime was toppled in December 2024, Syria entered a process of forming a new political and constitutional order. The victorious faction, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which formally disbanded on 29 January, and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, who assumed the role of president, have dominated this transition. The new government has gained de facto recognition from the international community and formal acceptance from the main political forces within the country. However, Syria remains a deeply divided state plagued by internal conflicts in which external actors, primarily Turkey and Israel, play an active role.

Post-Assad Syria has fundamentally reshaped the regional balance of power. Iranian and Russian influence has diminished, giving way to greater Turkish and Israeli involvement. This new reality has made the need for lasting stability all the more pressing. Turkey, the Gulf states, and the EU have the greatest interest in stabilising Syria, albeit on their own terms; the latter two actors have only limited tools to influence the country’s internal dynamics. The United States has adopted a distant and ambiguous stance towards the developments unfolding in Syria. For different reasons, Syria’s ongoing instability serves the interests of Israel, Iran, and Russia. Normalisation, whether in the realm of security and politics or in socio-economic terms, remains a distant prospect. Conflicting interests among external actors, combined with limited means at their disposal, remain a major obstacle to stabilisation.

Syria after the fall of the Assad regime: illusory stability

On 8 December 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of Islamist opposition forces with radical roots (its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa formerly headed al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch), seized power in Damascus following a sweeping offensive that resulted in the collapse of the Assad regime. Over the past decade, HTS had operated from its stronghold in Idlib province, where it established political and military structures and waged its campaign against Assad with Turkish support.

In just over three months of its rule, HTS has laid the foundations for a new political order in Syria. Sharaa, the leader of the victorious faction, assumed the role of head of state after being ‘appointed’ president on 29 January by forces subordinate to HTS; on the same day, the organisation formally disbanded. On 30 March, a permanent government was established to replace the interim administration. The legal framework for its operation is set out in the provisional constitution announced on 13 March, which is intended to remain in force for five years. It was drafted through dialogue involving representatives of society selected by HTS. The document provides for a strong presidential system where the president exercises effective control over both the legislative and judicial branches. It defines Syria as a unitary state based on the rule of law that guarantees basic freedoms, with Islamic jurisprudence serving as the principal source of legislation.

The new leadership has secured the formal allegiance of the country’s main political and military forces through negotiations. However, these actors played only a minimal role in drafting the constitution and forming the new government. The representatives of ethnic and religious minorities involved in this process were not affiliated with political parties. Despite serious frictions and conflicts, Shara and, in effect, HTS constitute the sole and uncontested central authority in Syria. They have gained de facto international recognition, engaging in working-level political dialogue with regional states, Europe, the United States, and Russia, even though HTS remains listed as a terrorist organisation by the United States and the European Union.

Devastated by the civil war that has raged since 2011, the country faces a number of fundamental challenges. These include establishing an effective administration, reintegrating its various regions, holding the Assad regime accountable, resolving property disputes, avoiding a humanitarian disaster (with 90% of the population living below the poverty line), and arranging the return of refugees. More broadly, the new Syrian government must prepare the foundations for rebuilding the state and the economy. Its most urgent priorities include establishing effective territorial control, ensuring basic security, and consolidating public legitimacy. In all these areas, it faces daunting obstacles.

The first and most fundamental challenge stems from Syria’s profound political and military fragmentation. Nearly one third of the country’s territory is controlled by the self-proclaimed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, dominated by Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The administration has its own military – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), numbering up to 100,000 fighters, approximately three times the size of HTS’s core forces. The SDF has been trained, armed and protected by the United States; under various circumstances, it has cooperated with Russia, Iran, and Israel. The Administration has developed effective political and institutional arrangements that are at odds with the traditions of Islamist-rooted movements. The SDF has formally recognised the authority of the Damascus-based government, although it has been sharply critical of the new constitution and central administration. It has also declared its willingness to integrate its regular units into the emerging national army. Even with goodwill from both sides, this process would take years to complete.

The northern parts of the country controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA), which was formed under Turkish supervision, also exhibit a high degree of autonomy. The local administrative structures and economy are closely integrated with Turkey; Turkish army units have been stationed in and operated from these areas. The SNA, whose military strength is at least on par with that of HTS, has declared full subordination to Damascus, but in practice remains under Turkey’s control. The central government retains only nominal authority over southern Syria, which is controlled by Sunni factions from the former opposition and by Druze groups; part of this region is now under Israeli occupation. Another mounting challenge is securing control over the coastal provinces, which are inhabited by Alawites (the core support base of the former Assad regime) and other minorities including Christians and Ismailis. Eastern Syria, a foothold for the Islamic State, also continues to generate potential security threats.

The security situation remains far from stable. In the north, clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed SNA continue unabated. Tensions are escalating rapidly in the west, where regrouped forces of the former regime launched an ‘uprising’ in early March. Over the course of three days of fighting, combined casualties on both sides approached 600 killed – nearly as many as during the offensive that led to Assad’s downfall. Between 1,000 and 1,600 civilians were killed in massacres during the clashes.

Syria is also an area of enduring presence for external actors, primarily Israel, Turkey, and the United States (see below), all of whom have been conducting military operations on its territory. Incidents related to Hezbollah’s suspected support for post-Assad forces have frequently occurred along the border with Lebanon. Extremist Islamist groups, most notably the Islamic State, but also radical, autonomous factions within HTS and the SNA (including former foreign jihadists, such as Uyghur and Central Asian fighters) continue to pose potential security threats. Moreover, criminal networks, particularly those involved in drug production, may provide funding for destabilising activities. Under Assad, Syria was responsible for approximately 80% of global captagon output.

Turkey: a reward for ‘strategic patience’

Turkey is seeking to stabilise Syria under Shara’s leadership, hoping to reap the benefits of its support for the opposition since 2013 and its assistance to HTS since 2018. At that time, Ankara effectively extended a political umbrella over the group and began cooperating with it in managing the security situation in Idlib. After 2020, Turkey further consolidated its ties with HTS by helping it to halt a joint Russian-Syrian offensive on the city. Turkish support for HTS included humanitarian aid to the province and tacit, if not outright, approval of the coalition’s operations to generate profits from cross-border trade, despite HTS being officially listed as a terrorist organisation in Turkey.

Turkey has also cooperated with HTS in the field of intelligence sharing and likely supported the group’s ideological evolution while building close personal ties with its leadership. For instance, HTS-appointed foreign minister Hassan al-Shibani pursued doctoral studies at a Turkish university. In all likelihood, Turkey also coordinated with HTS during the coalition’s 2024 offensive. The Syrian National Army (SNA), which is closely tied to Ankara, remains a key instrument of Turkish influence over HTS. Against this backdrop, Turkish policymakers expect that the new government in Damascus will enable them to pursue their key interests in Syria.

Firstly, Turkey expects assistance in dismantling the Kurdish quasi-state, perceiving its existence and development as an existential threat. Secondly, it hopes that stabilising Syria will facilitate the mass return of refugees. In recent years, their large presence in Turkey, peaking at approximately 3.5 million and currently estimated at about 3 million, has generated socio-political controversy, eroding public support for the ruling coalition. On several occasions, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders have announced plans for the voluntary repatriation of refugees, but have failed to implement them. The limited number of Syrian nationals who have returned since December 2024 (approximately 133,000 according to figures presented by the president last March) indicates that mass returns cannot be realistically expected without stabilising the situation in Syria. Thirdly, Turkey hopes that the new government in Damascus will allow Turkish companies, especially those from the construction sector, to participate in Syria’s reconstruction on preferential terms. Fourthly, it assumes that stabilising Syria under its pro-Turkish government will facilitate the implementation of strategic projects. On the one hand, this concerns a potential agreement on the delimitation of maritime borders in the Mediterranean, which would expand Turkey’s capacity to block unfavourable energy agreements in these waters, such as the EastMed pipeline project designed to transport local gas to Europe via Greece and Italy, bypassing Turkey. On the other hand, Ankara sees an opportunity to advance its own energy ambitions, for example by resuming talks on the construction of a gas pipeline from Qatar.

Turkey aims to pursue its objectives using a broad array of tools. The most important of these include its military presence on Syrian territory, cooperation with the SNA and the ability to advise the HTS-led government on how to build state institutions and develop strong economic ties, notably through the economic activity of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey. Ankara also has the capacity to influence other actors involved in Syria, primarily Russia and Iran.

In recent months, Turkey has taken steps aimed at advancing the objectives outlined above.^[1] It has lobbied in Europe and the United States for the lifting of sanctions on Syria, decided to reopen its embassy in Damascus and its consulate in Aleppo – partly in a bid to strengthen the new government’s legitimacy – and signalled its willingness to assume primary responsibility for fighting the Islamic State while involving other regional countries in this effort; to this end, a meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria was held in Amman on 9 March. This last aspect is particularly important for Turkey, as it aims to persuade the United States to fully withdraw from Syria and end its cooperation with the SDF. Such a development would significantly weaken this organisation and potentially compel it to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards the Damascus-based government.

The need to secure US support for the implementation of its plans in Syria is only one example of Turkey’s limitations. Another arises from the country’s protracted economic crisis, which has left it without the resources to fund reconstruction projects. This has forced it to seek additional funding from its EU partners and Qatar. As a result, it faces the risk of losing its status as the ‘primary partner’ of the government in Damascus, which feels compelled to seek international partners who are better positioned to support the country’s economic recovery; indeed, it has sent its first government delegations to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Turkey is also increasingly aware of the risks posed by the actions of Israel, which perceives the growing power of HTS as a threat and is now signalling that a confrontation with Turkey in Syria is inevitable.

Israel: the power of negative influence

Following the fall of Assad, Israel launched, and continues to conduct, aggressive military operations against Syria, pursuing a number of objectives:

• destroying Syria’s military potential,
• seizing strategically significant locations, such as the summit of Mount Hermon,
• creating a buffer zone,
• establishing a sphere of influence within Syrian territory,
• gaining leverage over Syria’s internal situation by supporting centrifugal forces.

Even though the new government in Damascus has not taken any hostile steps against Israel and has been combating Iranian influence on its territory, on 8 December 2024 Israeli forces launched attacks on Syrian military facilities, conducting over 600 airstrikes in the initial days of the operation, and commenced a ground invasion of southern Syria. During the air campaign, they destroyed airports, air defence systems, rocket launchers, land equipment, weapons depots, and naval vessels. As part of the ground operation, they initially seized the 235 km² demilitarised zone established under the Israeli-Syrian agreement that followed the 1973 war, before advancing several kilometres deeper into Syrian territory.

In doing so, Israel violated the terms of this agreement, which had been in force for 50 years. However, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that, in light of the change of government in Damascus, the agreement became null and void.. According to him, these actions were undertaken to ‘prevent threats to the Golan Heights’ – a territory recognised under international law as part of Syria that Israel has occupied and colonised since 1967 and illegally annexed in 1981. After Israeli forces crossed the border, Netanyahu announced plans to double the number of settlements in the area.

The Israeli side has stated that its forces will remain in Syria until ‘the threats cease’, which in practice means indefinitely. In the seized territories, Israel has established military outposts and field bases; in some cases, it has forced residents to leave the areas they inhabited. On 25 March, Israeli forces used tanks during clashes with local residents in one of the Syrian villages, killing at least nine people.

Israel also aims to secure a 60-kilometre-wide zone of influence in Syria. It has demanded the demilitarisation of the country’s south and unilaterally declared a protectorate over the local Druze population, sparking mixed reactions among the Druze themselves. Moreover, Israel seeks to undermine the domestic authority of the new Syrian government, particularly by supporting the Druze population and, more discreetly, the Kurds, and to delegitimise it internationally by highlighting its links to al-Qaeda. Israel’s main objective is to weaken the emerging political order and prevent Damascus from regaining effective control over the entire Syrian territory – a position that, paradoxically, places Israel alongside Iran as one of the key actors with a vested interest in maintaining instability in Syria.

There are several reasons behind this approach. At a broader level, it reflects Israel’s strategic ambition to consolidate its position in the region and effectively achieve a hegemonic status. At the more immediate level, it stems from concerns that the stabilisation of its neighbour could facilitate the expansion of Turkish influence, including in the military sphere, which would inevitably constrain Israel’s own regional ambitions. According to Reuters, Israel has even sought US support for maintaining Russian military bases in Syria as a means of containing Turkey. More broadly, Israel tends to prefer fragile, internally fragmented states with weak international standing in its immediate neighbourhood – and it is seeking to sustain this pattern in Syria.

The losers: Iran and Russia

The fall of Assad marked the failure of the policies pursued by Iran and Russia – two countries that had maintained allied relations with Syria for decades and, during the civil war, intervened militarily to support the regime, playing a decisive role in its survival. Both have now lost their previous political leverage and assets in Syria. Iran has been forced to withdraw its forces from Syrian territory, a development that has significantly weakened its influence in Lebanon and Iraq while simultaneously strengthening the regional position of Turkey and Israel. Iran itself now faces the prospect of full-scale war against Israel and the United States. Russia, for its part, had to dismantle its military outposts in Syria and scale down its presence at key bases – the naval facility in Tartus and the airbase in Khmeimim. As a result, its role and ability to project power in this part of the world have been significantly diminished.

Both countries have officially accepted the new reality. Russia’s primary objective is to secure the renewal of agreements on the lease of its military bases, which are essential for pursuing its security interests in the Mediterranean and Africa. In a broader perspective, Moscow hopes to rebuild some of its influence in Syria (and the region) and position itself as a balancing actor within the complex and dynamic regional balance of power. This prospect seems appealing to countries such as Israel and the United States, particularly in the context of their anti-Iran policies. Russia has offered the Syrian leadership political legitimacy (for example, Vladimir Putin and Sharaa held a telephone conversation in February) and greater room for manoeuvre. The talks between the two sides have covered a number of issues, including Syria’s demands for the extradition of Assad and the recovery of the assets he seized, as well as Russia’s offer of economic assistance – including oil supplies – and its effective adoption of a stance of benevolent neutrality towards the new government. Russia retains leverage over post-Assad forces, Kurdish groups, and foreign Islamist radicals operating in Syria. Given its limited resources, Moscow needs sustained uncertainty and tensions in and around Syria to maintain its relevance in the regional power game.

With regard to Iran, both its influence over Damascus and its operational options within Syria have become more limited, while the stakes involved have dramatically increased. Naturally, Iran’s leverage over Syria primarily stems from its links to post-Assad and Alawite groups, rooted in long-standing ties and geographic proximity to Lebanon that provided it with greater capacity to exert influence. In addition, it has long maintained a channel of limited cooperation with the SDF, driven by a shared perception of the threat posed by Turkey’s growing clout and opposition to a unitary Syria dominated by Sunni Arabs. The US and other actors have also accused Iran of creating and supporting radical Sunni groups, such as the Islamic Resistance Front, also known as Uli al-Baas, in southern Syria.^[2] Lacking other, more constructive political instruments in Syria and facing a difficult strategic situation – notably the ongoing erosion of its regional influence and the growing threat of war with Israel and the United States – Iran is particularly interested in sustaining tensions in Syria – though it is unlikely to pursue a full-scale conflict in the immediate future.

The United States: distance and ambivalence

The United States remains a constant factor in Syria’s dynamics, maintaining a military presence of approximately 2,000 troops. Washington’s primary objective is to combat the resurgence of Islamic State and other extremist organisations; it has regularly conducted special operations against these networks. Its main partner and client in this effort is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which has been trained, armed, and protected by the US military. An additional objective is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. More broadly, the US presence on the ground has allowed it to contain Turkish expansion in the region, influence developments in Iraq, and, above all, monitor and limit Iranian influence. US policy towards Syria – particularly during Donald Trump’s first term and, seemingly, also at present – has oscillated between maintaining its military presence and reducing it or withdrawing from the country altogether, while potentially delegating critical responsibilities to Turkey (combating the Islamic State and handling its prisoners) and to Israel.

Ambivalence and uncertainty have continued to characterise the US approach to Syria following HTS’s takeover. The United States quickly established working-level contacts with the new administration, suspended the arrest warrant for Shara, which had been issued due to his past affiliation with al-Qaeda, and suspended certain sanctions to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid. At the same time, it has retained most of its existing restrictions on Syria, including the so-called Caesar Act, and on HTS, which remains listed as a terrorist organisation, a designation that effectively blocks any financial relations with Syria. The US has also demanded that the new Syrian government cooperate in combating terrorism, including by removing former foreign jihadists from state structures, and in eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. Another issue that resonates in the US is the perceived threat to the survival of Christian communities in Syria.

The European Union: ensuring inclusivity or reverting to sanctions

The European Union has also shown interest in stabilising Syria. This stems mainly from the destabilisation that the decade-long Syrian conflict, particularly the resulting influx of refugees, has caused in a number of EU member states. For this reason, the EU has declared its readiness to support efforts to normalise the situation in the country, provided that the new Syrian government establishes an ‘inclusive political system’. This term refers to the EU’s demand that all ethnic and religious groups in Syria should be guaranteed political representation – a requirement largely rooted in concerns that the exclusion of such groups could become a source of future conflict. To encourage Damascus to meet these demands, on 24 February the EU Council decided to suspend certain sanctions on Syria, including those targeting the energy and transport sectors, as well as restrictions affecting relations between the banking sectors. The decision to suspend, rather than lift, these sanctions is intended to underscore the conditional and reversible nature of this measure. However, the effectiveness of this instrument is limited, not least due to the existing US sanctions, which deter European businesses from operating in Syria. In the security domain, the EU’s influence on the situation in Syria remains minimal.

The Gulf monarchies: potential sponsors of reconstruction

The Gulf monarchies have a vested interest in preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and preventing the emergence of new security vacuums that could facilitate the resurgence of the Islamic State or similar radical outfits. They attach great importance to regional stability as the rulers of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar seek to dampen internal conflicts that continue to disrupt the socio-political landscape of the Middle East.

In this context, the Gulf states are in a position to provide Syria with two forms of assistance: financial support and participation in the country’s economic reconstruction, as well as lobbying, particularly in the United States, for the lifting of sanctions, notably the aforementioned Caesar Act. However, the extent of this support remains unclear. Exerting effective pressure on the United States may prove challenging, especially if the Trump administration remains strongly influenced by Israel.

Any efforts undertaken by the Arab monarchs may also be disrupted by competition among them for influence in Syria and, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, by their desire to leverage their position to contain the influence of Turkey, a vital security partner for the government in Damascus. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the rulers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been reluctant to fully endorse Shara, fearing the brand of political Islam that he represents.

Outlook

The prospect of stabilising Syria remains distant. The country’s most pressing security challenges include the issue of Kurdish autonomy and the coastal provinces inhabited by Alawites, followed by the need to marginalise radical groups. The new government is highly unlikely to regain full sovereignty over the country’s territory, particularly the areas occupied by Israel. Ensuring its authority and sustaining its relatively moderate political course will largely depend on its ability to address socio-economic problems. This, however, will not be possible without substantial external support, particularly financial assistance, which requires the lifting of sanctions.

Syria will remain a key arena of competition between regional actors. For some of them, the weakness of the Syrian government and persistent tensions in the country are acceptable, or even desirable, as such conditions provide opportunities to counter the influence of their rivals. Turkey’s vision of a stabilised Syria remains a distant prospect, not least due to Ankara’s limited financial resources and the countermeasures taken by other countries. Most importantly, this vision is based on the elimination of Kurdish autonomy – an outcome that would inevitably lead to an escalation of the existing conflict.

The direct influence of both the European Union and the Gulf states on Syria’s security environment will likely remain too limited to support ambitious political projects. The future direction of US policy towards the government in Damascus, the Kurdish question, and efforts to counter Iranian influence and Sunni radical groups remains uncertain. Under current conditions, a greater US engagement in the security sphere, let alone in Syria’s reconstruction, appears highly improbable. Washington’s policy towards Syria will likely be shaped by its broader relations with Israel, Turkey, and, to a lesser extent, the Arab states, as well as by its strategy towards Iran and Russia.

Regardless of local conditions, future developments in Syria will depend on the dynamics across the wider Middle East. The ongoing and escalating conflict between Iran and both Israel and the United States will play a particularly important role. This confrontation was a decisive factor in the downfall of Assad: Israeli military operations in the months leading up to this pivotal moment effectively neutralised Hezbollah and significantly reduced Iran’s presence in Syria, creating the conditions for HTS to seize power. It is reasonable to assume that the crisis surrounding Iran will continue to play a fundamental role in shaping Syria’s future.